UEFI Secure Boot support for NixOS
Add a self-sovereign root of trust as part of supply chain security
This project combines the power of the reproducible package manager Nix with the cryptographic protections of UEFI Secure Boot to provide concrete assurances about the authenticity of the software being booted into. Supply chain security works upward from a root of trust, which has to be in place before the very first bytes of code are even executed by a host’s CPU. UEFI Secure Boot helps provide this root of trust. Using UEFI Secure Boot, the host’s firmware will only boot the operating system if it is signed by a key stored in the firmware. This key may be issued by Microsoft, or in this project’s case, be generated by the user. This can help resist attacks from malware or other attacks against the system’s integrity. Obviously, when people use a commodity operating system commercially available to everyone (like Microsoft Windows) the security protection is far less and the risks are far greater than when someone generates a custom operating system with a reproducible tool like Nix. The Host and signing service will use TPM-backed attestation keys to mutually attest the authenticity of the requests.
This tool will initially support systemd-boot and uboot, however the project will be specifically designed with the intention of supporting additional bootloaders.
- The project's own website: https://github.com/nix-community/lanzaboote
This project was funded through the NGI Assure Fund, a fund established by NLnet with financial support from the European Commission's Next Generation Internet programme, under the aegis of DG Communications Networks, Content and Technology under grant agreement No 957073.